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Abstract. Partial functions are the most suitable characterization of program effects. Formal 
reasoning on programs should be supported by logics dealing with partial functions. In this paper, 
we present a first order, three -valued logic for partial functions, together with a semantical 
motivation of its model theory. We also present a calculus for the logic, proving its soundness 
and completeness. The calculus is introduced together with a methodology for building calculi 
for logics involving partial functions. 
It is a well-known fact that, in computer scie ce, usually we have to argue about 
programs which fail to terminate for so e inputs, although they terminate for the 
rest of the inputs giving the expected ou ut. Often a recursive procedure computes 
a function provided that its inputs satisfy some condition, and rltherwise it recurs 
infinitely. Iterative programs can loop infinitely for some inputs, while others cause 
abnormal termination of program computations making the output undefined, for 
instance stack overflow, values out of range, etc. 
Proving program correctness, checking the sotindness of pro ram transformations 
and in general reasoning formally about programs, requires 
effect of programs by means of mathematical functions, an it is because of 
nontermination and exceptional termin 
Other important areas dealing wi 
formal specification of abstract d 
programming languages [23, 2, 61 
Whenever a partial function d 
term takes the undefined se 
propagation), un 
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arly attempts to define a semantics for ic without identity 
d and complete calculus 
more recently from a 
to only one semantics 
A major zim of the present ich are the semantic 
possibilities for logics dealing with partial functions and their relationships, as a 
basis to give good semantical motivation of our choice. After presenting the language 
in Section 1, we devote Section 2 to this task. 
In the rest of the paper we show how to obtain a sound and complete sequent 
calculus by applying the tableaux method [4, 251. S ction 3 presents a tableaux 
method for PFOL and Section 4 proves that it is a so nd and co;rplete refutation 
method. In Section 5 we explain the relation between o e tableaux method and 
completeness of a calculus, setting up sufficient completeness conditions for formal 
derivability in PFOL. In Section 6 we present a sequent calculus together with its 
soundness and completeness proofs. Finally, Section 7 is a summary of conclusions 
and related TNorks. 
. resentation of t 
The main difference between PFOL and traditional first order logic is in allowing 
partial predicates and partial functions. Terms, as well as formulas, can yield 
undefined values when they are interpreted. Undefined values are considered “bot- 
tom” elements (__I) and structures for semantic interpretation are extended with 
them. The language of traditional predicate logic is extended with a new symbol A 
expressing definedness of terms and formulas. The semantics of propositional 
connectives is defined by allowing formulas to yield defined values, although some 
of its subformulas might be undefined, provi ed that defined subformulas gave 
enough information. 
we assume a countable first order signature C and countable sets 
FS of function J; g, . . J, and 
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. Given E, the set f.ose elements will be de 
4 l?, ~?9**=, and the set F’ o else elements will 
lowercase greek letters <p, $, . . . , are defined, respectively, by the 
term ::= first order term If( I,, . . . , t,, ) 1 if x then t 1 
if x then t, else tz 
where x is a quantifier-free formula, 
formula ::= t, = tz (equation) 1 
P(h,-r 
3r (definedness of terms) 1 
-icp (negation) 1 
cp A I) (conjunction) I
3 X p (existential quantification) I
Aq (definedness of formulas). 
We also allow abbreviations: p v + for l(lcp A T$), <p -+ $ for . I( cp A T$), cp ++ q+ 
for (~-++)h(++cp), VXcp for 73X7’p. 
In order to interpret terms and formulas, possibly yielding undefined values, we 
apply Scott’s well-known idea [22], and model partial functions as strict functions 
over a flat cpo. More precisely we consider C-structures 
Functions f’” : (A,) + Ai are required to be strict over the flat cpo A, obtained 
by enlarging A with the bottom element _lA [23], and predicates p,” : (A,) + B, are 
also strict functions over the boolean flat cpo with the domain (1, J I}, where _L~ 
is abbreviated as I, and the order is displayed by the diagram: 
Given a C-structure ~4, a valuation cr over & is any function (T: V+ A. Notice 
that only defined values may be assigned to variables. A Zinterpretation 9 is any 
pair (&, C) where & is a C-structure and u a valuation over J& 3(t) (resp. $( cp)) 
will denote the value in the interpretation 3 of the term t (resp. formula <p). The 
value of first order terms is defined as in first order logic, the only difierence being 
that in PFQL, functions can yield __I+. And for the two remaining cases we define 
$(if x then t) = 
8(i) if%:) =I, 
IA 
$(if x then t, else t2) 
The operator d is introduc 
if $(t) is not IA, and f if B;(r) is Notice 
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Our interpretation of equality is “weak” and strict, that is to say 9 ( f, - E*) yields 
_I_ if‘ ;ither 8;( t,) or B;(iJ (or boih) is -kA, and if both of them are not & then it is 
,t if $( tl) = $( t2) and f otherwise. 
The negation of a formula is interpreted by the trivial extension which gives the 
opposite boolean value when the formula is defined an _L when is undefined. 
Logical connectives in a partial logic admit several interpretations. Two classical 
definitions are those in [20] and [ 151. McCarthy proposed strict, so called sequential 
connectives, while Kleene chose to work with non-strict, so called parallel co 
nectives. We follow 
defined by 
Kleenes’s approach and thus obtain a parallel conjunction 
1 if$Ycp)=fandJQH=_t, 
[ if$(Q) =for$(‘b) =J?’ 
I otherwise. 
Using the abbreviations, we obtain the following interpretation for the remaining 
connectives: 
if$Yq) =1 or8($) =.4 
$(Q v @) = if$YQ) =fand 8(@ 
aQ-a= 
A<p-iN= 
1 ifY(sc) =foCWf> =I. 
f if8;b) =I and$(+) =& 
_L otherwise; 
,r if-B;(Q), $(‘h) are both defined and equal, 
f if-$(Q), $(d are both defined, but not equal, 
I otherwise. 
Notice that v and + are non-strict, but w is strict; and that w and v are 
commutative. Also Q v TQ (excluded middle) is true or undefined in any interpreta- 
tion, but it is not always true. And Q A TQ (contradiction) is false or undefined in 
any interpretation but it is not always false. 
When reasoning about definedness of formulas we use the same operator A, as 
for terms. $(illp) yields 1 if $(Q) =I or $(Q) ==f, and f if $( Q) = 1. Because A is 
total and non-strict the formulas ddr, ddcp, (At v;At), <AQ v TAP) are always true 
(and a fortiori defined) in any interpretation. 
The sematics of quantifiers is defined by forcing variables to range over A, that 
is, over the proper elements. This gives a non-strict interpretation corresponding to 
the natural analogy with Kleene’s conllectives, in opposition to a strict interpretation 
which could be obtained by analogy with McCarthy’s connectives. We define 
_t 
i- 
if there is a E A such that $[a/x]( cp) = j, 
$(3 X Q) = f if$[a/x](rp) =ffor all a E A, 
I otherwise, 
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where $[a/~] is the interpretation which assigns the value ar FO x am.l coincides 
with 9 in everything else. 
A formula 3x1~ is undefined if there exists a defined value of x for w 
undefined, and 50 is false for all defined values of x making (9 defined. For example, 
in Z the formula 3x(x div x = 1) is true (and defined), but 3x--7(x div x = 1) is 
undefined because for 0 the formula ~(0 div 0 = 1) is undefined, and is false for any 
other integer. On the other side, 3x(-$x = 0) A 9(x div x = 1)) is false (and de~ned~. 
For the abbreviation V, we have the followi on-strict interpretation: 
if for all Q E A: $[a/ 
is a E A such that $[a/~]( 9) =S, 
Notice that VxAx is always true (and defined), because the quantification ranges 
over A. A formula Vxcp is undefined whenever 50 is true for all defined values of x 
for which 49 is defined, but there exists a defined value of x for which cp is undefined. 
Far example, in Z the formula Vx(x div x = 1) is undefined because 0 div 0% 1 is 
undefined, but for any other integer x div x c= 1 is defined and true. On the other 
hand, the formula Vx(l(x == 0) + (x div x = I)) is defined and true. 
From the above definitions it follows that every interpretation 6 satisfies 
(a) $(Ax,) =,t and $(lAx,) =J: We represent hese formulas by T and t;, respec- 
tively. 
(b) $(if F then x,) = &, so $(if F then x0= x0) = 1. We represent his r”ormula 
by 0. 
Classical concepts like “x occurs free (or bound) in <p”, “&/x]” (that is, 
substitution of t for x in <p), etc. are defined as in first order logic [24]. Analogously 
PFOL satisfies the following. 
Lemma 1.2 (Substitution). For any interpretation2 and any term t such thatj( t) # _L~ 
B;bCtlxl) =9Dwl~lbh 
2. Model theory of PFOL 
Since we have three valued formulas, the definition of semantical notions such 
as model, satisfiability and logical consequence, needs some reflection. Sets of 
formulas will be denoted by uppercase greek letters @, IY, D, . . . . 
Definition 2.1. Let 9 be an interpretation and Q, u {cp} a set of formulas. Then: 
(i) $strongl’~satisfiescp (or$isastrongmodeIofcp)ifl$(ap)=f (writtenJ +=\ cp); 
(ii) 9 weakly satisjes q~ (or 8; is a weak model of cp) i 9(&#J(writtenB 6%++; 
(iii) 8; i=a @ iff 8; l=a 9 for all cp E @, where a E {s, w}; 
(iv) @ is strongly satis$able iff there exists an interpretation 9 such that $ + \ 
we will write Sat, Qi to denote it; 
(v) +a @ iff for every interpretation 2: 9 +a @, where a E {s, w>- 
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e above concepts of strong and weak model there 
;tzaP consequence, as follows. 
are four possibilities 
0112.2. Let @u(q) beasetof rmuias and let ~1, b range over the set (s, w}. 
We define 
retation +lor 
these four concepts 
definitions. 
holds: 
Let us now make so s to motivate the choice of a consequence 
notion. we already know strongest notion and kPr the weakest one. 
Let @w @xJ($$ ) be a set of formulas. For every lo ical consequence I=(re we 
note: 
wm Deduction eorem 
@,&%?Jr*@bAP+ 
Msdus nens 
e following table hoIds: 
yes no 
e positive statements are easy to check. For the negative ones we have 
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(3) Finally we have T I== ,,,’ f2 and 0 /== ,,,. F but ‘T W,,,. E So k XM’ does not satisfy 
CUT. 0 
There are weaker versions for DT, MP and CUT. Consider 
(DT,) @, <B 6&Q*@. & ~=ah$-#(L, 
(MPJ 40, AQ, 50" 'b t=ah& 
‘The following table Aokis: 
DT_, MP, CUT_1 
Proof. Positive cases are easily checked. For the negative one we have 7, A;$ 
T-,0 I&., Lt. So MPJ is false for k=,.,. q 
In view of Propositions 2.4 and 2.5 we decide to choose the logical consequence 
bs,,. which is weaker than ail: others and can be related to a sequent calculus. We 
abbreviate I= pK to I= in what follows. Notice that our logical consequence admits 
the following characterization in terms of strong satisfiability. 
Proposition 2.6. For any set ofsormuCas @ w { 50): @ I== cp e Not Sat, 48 u (-I(P). 
Finally, we show that any of the four logical consequence notions could have 
been taken as primitive, because once we have fixed one, all others can be deduced 
from it. 
In this section we present a tableaux method [ 
formulation of Smullyan [25]. Later, we s 
building a sound and complete sequent calculus fo 
tuemats ai, Q~,...,eY,, with 3 1 and m finite. Schematically: 
Q ??a* 
(2) BETA is the set of ~~sj~l~~~~~e formulas /3 which must satisfy 
}-Sat, @w (/3,} or.. . or Sat, @v (Pm) 
e constituents np with m a 2 and m finite. Their scheme is: 
. 
ch must satisfy 
for every term to Tz. In this case we have infin 
different t. The scheme is now: 
y constituents for the 
Sat, 
e set of existential formu s S which must satisfy 
eSat,@u{6(c)} 
enever c is a new auxiliary constant ring neither in 4D nor in S. So, for each 
c E C it is possible to obtain a constituent 6(c). In this case the scheme is: 
At, 
T 
fP3) 
TAif ,y then tl else t2 
+y /\ -At, 1 TX A lAt2 ( TAX 
WV -_lic- 4-V 
(9 is neither A$ nor 
‘I +1&l = Iq 
‘I1 IZI = Iwl 
‘I +(u 3 i 3 1: iFJ I)xtiu 2 = I( “1 ‘ l l l ‘Il)d( 
‘I ++I ‘1111 xeuI~=~s~l] 
‘I + (I’1 1 ‘I’1 [ ‘IXl}xlrm = p asp ‘1 uay3 x j!I 
‘I +{I1 I ‘IXI}X~~ = 11 uqt x jq 
ala suog3unj asay~~ l Slossa3apald sp! liejo 19s aQ1 Q~!dlh paypuap! aq ue3 
1aqturau ~ELuplo Icuts ]t?Q, laqurawa~ xqtunu II?u!plo a$!uyu! )SWl ay, S! @I GWyM 
l %I!q3aQ3 pJl%tUOj~Q%~eJ~~ .Joord 
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Preof, The ordering requirements of ALFA 
easily checked taking the corresponding s 
arithmetic. The GAMMA and DELTA ordering requirements follow st 
wardly from the following property. For any signature 2, any Z-terms I: s. any 
variable x and any X-formula q, 
it[s/x]]=]tl+k forsomeOSk<o, 
~~[s/x]]=~&i-k forsomeOSk<o. 
The inductive proof of this property has no di 
Tableaux are trees with formulas labelling their nodes. A tableau is usually b 
for the purpose of refuting a finite (or countably infinite) set of formulas. 
bonstruction of a tableau starts with a linear finite tree labelled by formulas o 
original set, and develops by applying rules corresponding to the schemes in the 
given classification (cf. Definition 3.6). 
A branch of a tree whose nodes are labelled by formulas is said to be closed 
when it contains an “obvious” contradiction (cf. Definition 3.9, and otherwise it 
is said to be open. The underlying idea is that a tree with all of its branches closed 
is a refutation of the set used during the construction. 
Definition 3.5. Given a set of s-formulas @, we say that @ is an incoherent set of 
formulas iff it satisfies someone of the following conditions: 
(1) there is a formula cp such that either p, -IV E @ or p, 18~ E @ or 19, TAP E @; 
(2) -IAXE @ for some variable x; 
(3) IAC E @ for some auxiliary constant c E C. 
Otherwise we say that Q, is a coherent set. 
Let 9 be a tree with formulas of PFOL’s language labelling its nodes. We say 
that a branch of 9, with r as the set of formulas labelling its nodes, is closed iff r 
is incoherent. 
Otherwise we say that the branch is open. 
Definition 3.6. AJinite tableau for a non-empty set offormulas @ is a tree inductively 
defined by the following rules. 
(0) Lf{9*,(P*,**V p,#} c @ then the following tree 
is a finite tableau for @. 
(a) If 9 is a finite tableau for @ and Q! E ALFA belongs to some open branc 
of 9, then the tree resulting from enlarging this branch wit the hst Qf its Co* st i  
049 . . . , a, is a finite tableau for @. 
h 
o---___ 
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On the other side, if @ has no closed tableau, then we must be able to build a 
strong model of @. Every set of formulas has at least 2 tableau, the so called 
canonical tclbleau, which is “complete” in the sense that no further development 
can add new logical information to its branches. Hlntikka sets will be introduced 
to make the notion of comp!ete tableau precise. All Hiniikka sets are strongly 
satisfiable. If the canonical tableau of Qi is not closed then it will have at least an 
open branch. That branch will turn out to be 2 Hintikka set which includes a, so 
any strong mo el of this branch will become a strong model of @. 
In this section, we prove the following. 
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness and completeness of the tableaux method). Let @ be any 
non-empty set of formulas; the following conditions are equivalent: 
(a) not Sat, @; 
(b) there is a closed tableau for @. 
(a)*(b) means completeness of the tableaux method and (b)+(a) means sound- 
ness. We want to advise that only (a)+(b) will be needed to prove the completelizss 
of a calculus for PFOL. We prove the pa:t (b)+(a) to ensure the soundness of 
tableaux refutation for our logic, since this result is of independent interest. 
The proof of (b)+(a) is based on the relation between models of @ and models 
of branches of finite tableaux for 0, established in the next proposition, and on the 
fact that a closed tableau is always finite and no one of its branches has strong models. 
Proposition 4.3. Let 9 be a finite tableau far a non-empty set of Z-formulas Qi and 
qZ, G @ the subset used in 3. For every Zinterpretatiun 9 
9 l=.s @&for some s-interpretation $ expanding 9 and some branch of 
9 with set of labels ?& : 3 I=,$ !P@. 
Proof. (a) By induction on the construction of 9 (Definition 3.6). For rule (o) it 
is trivial because Q0 = VO. For the remaining rules the induction hypothesis guaran- 
tees that the assertion is true for & being 9 = &+, . If 9 is obtained by rule (a), 
(b) or (c), then the assertion is a straightforward consequence of the corresponding 
semantical requirement in Definition 3.1, taking 3 as the same s-interpretation of 
the inductive hypothesis for &. 
If 9 is obtained by rule (d) then we use the fact that if 3 l=, 6, u (6) then 
J[a/c] I=.% @u {S( cj} for some element a belonging to 3’s domain, and apply it to 
the s-interpretation 3 given by the induction hypothesis. 
In the case of rule (e), the assertion is right because t=,V 8 holds for any equality 
axiom 8. Rule (f) is obvious. 
(+) The other direction is immediate, since !&, 2 QO. 0 
We are now able to prove the soundness of tableaux method. 
.2. Let 5 bt a closed tableau for @. Since closed 
branches are not further expanded when buil ing a tableau, Y is a finite tableau 
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for @. Let Cp, be the finite subset of Qi used in the construction of 9. If 0 is stro 
satisfiable, then there exists a Z-interpretation 4, such that $ I=,% aO. By P 
4.3, 3 I=, !& for some s-interpretation 3 expanding 4 and some branch 
PO labelling its nodes. Since 9 is closed, !PO is an incoherent set and then is not 
strongly satisfiable (contradiction). Cl 
Mow let us introduce I-Iintikka sets, complete tableaux, and their main properties, 
causing the tableaux method to be complete. 
DeG&Perg 4.4, A set W of s-formulas is a Hintikka set iff the following conditions 
hold: 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
(E) 
(F) 
for every cy E ALFA: cy E W+Qti e HI for all i = 1,. . . ) m; 
foreverypEBETA: ~~W~~~~Wforsomei=l,...,m; 
for every y E GAMMA: y E IHI+ y( t) E W for all s-term t adequate to 
for every 8 E DELTA: S E H/36(c) E W for some c E C; 
every equality axiom adequate to HI belongs to HI; 
W is a coherent set of formulas. 
The following proposition establishes a property of Hintikka sets that will be 
used to prove its strong satisfiability. 
Proposition 4.5. For any Hintikka set if-U and any s-term t, if t is adequate to II-0 then 
Proof. Let t be a s-term adequate to HI such that 1At E W. Then using the Definition 
4.4 we have 
IAt c W+At E W. 
Vx(x-x)~D’(condition(E))~At-*(t2:t)~MI(condition(C)) 
+7At E W or -r(t = t) d-II (condition (B)) 
*11(t = t) E N {kyyoeiesis) 
+( t = t) E IHI (condition (A)) 
=+At E W (condition (A)). Cl 
Lemma 4.6. Any Hintikka set is strongly satisjiable. 
Proof. Let W c Fs be a Hintikka set. We shall construct a strong model of’ 0-I. Let 
us define the set of terms 
T,={~E TS/Atc3U} 
and the binary relation = over &.,, x TH by 
t=S:et=SfW 
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Next, we show that TN is not empty. The first auxiliary constant co is adquate to 
W, and since ii4 is coherent, lAco~ W; hence, AC, E W by Proposition 4.5. 
By using the three first equality axioms, it can be shown that = is an equivalence 
relation over TN. 
Furthermore using the equality axioms 
u’(a_Y’hAf(~)~f(~)3rf(~)) and 
j-j@ = j n Ax(n) A ~(2) +x(j)) 
it can be proved that for any ti, Si E TN such that ti z si, i = 1,. . . , n: 
(1) for any function symbol .f in 2, 
AfO 1,.=., t,)dWAf(s ,,..., s,)dHI; 
(2) for any quantifier-free formula x(x1, . . . , x,), 
x(t I,==-, t,)Ewa~(s ,,..., s,)EW. 
All this shows that the fcllowing %interpretation 3 = (2, (T) is well-defined. 
A = TN/ = (quotient set). In the sequel [ t] will denote the equivalence class of t. 
.G 
c = 
[c] ifAc&U, 
J-A otherwise, 
for any constant c in C. 
.a [I C 
C 
ifAc4-ll, 
= 
arbitrary element of A otherwise, 
for any auxiliary constant c E C. 
otherwise, 
andf.“(a,,..., a,) = IA if Qi = _LA forsome i=l,...,n. 
ifp(t,, . . . , tn)d#, 
if?p(&,.. , tn)dil, 
otherwise, 
andp*“(a ,,..., a,)=_Lifai=I.*forsomei=i ,..., n. 
Notice that in the above definition of p”([ t,], . . . , [t,]), the three cases are 
excluding because of property (F) in Definition 4.4. Notice also that 
p-y [ t,], . . . , [t,]) has an undefined value when HI says nothing about p(i) (that is 
to say, when neither p(i) nor -up belorq to II-O). 
The valuation c is defined by 
o(x) = r 1 X ifAxE0-0, 
arbitrary (defined) otherwise. 
Notice that (T(X) = [x] for any variable occ rfring free in Ha 
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To finish the proof we have to show that 3 (defined above) is a strong 
I-U. That will be handled by proving the following three facts by sim 
induction. 
Fact 4.7. For all ZE Tz: AtdHl+&t)=[t]. 
Fact 4.8. For all tE Tz: lAtd-b~(t)=~,. 
The proof will be based on the sematic properties of 3ur tableaux-oriented 
classification of formulas (cf. Definition 3.1). The induction is Justified by Definition 
3.3 and Proposition 3.4. Notice that this amounts to the use of transfinite inductio 
for proving Fact 4.9. 
From now on, the notation (A)-(F) refers to the conditions in Definition 4.4. 
Proof of Fact 4.7. For t being a constant c or a variable x, the fact is trivial due to 
the definition of c*’ and CT(X). 
For t=f(t,,..., tn): if AKW then At,, . . . , At, E HI, by (A) and by induction 
hypothesis and definition off.‘, we have j(t) =f”([ tJ, . . . , [t,,]) = [f( tl, _ . . , t,,)]. 
For t=if x then t,: since At E HI, by (A) we have that x, At, E HI, and by the 
induction hypothesis for both tl and x: &t) = [ tl], s(x) =_t; moreover x and the 
equality axiom Vx(,y A Ax + (if x then x) = x) belong to HI and so [if x then t,] = [t,] 
(using (A), (B), (C), (F)). So that s(t) = [tl] = [if x then tJ. 
For t = if x then tl else t2: since At E W, by (B) we have that either x A At, or 
1~ A At, belongs to O-U. If x A At, E ii4 ihx tisi;rq$ (A) we have x E IHI and using that 
the equality axiom 
(XA&Ak-,ifx then t else t’= t) 
A (ix A Ax A At’+ ifx then t eke t’= t’) 
is in W together with (A), (B), (C) and (F), we obtain [if x then t, else t2] = [It,]. 
From x A At, E Ii-0 and (A) we deduce that x, At, E I-0, which by induction hypothesis 
for tl and x means ,a’( t) = [ tl] = [if x then t1 else t,]. Analogously for the other 
case. El 
Proof of Fact 4.8. For t being a constant or variable, the fact follows immediately 
from the definition of 3 and (F). 
For t=f(t,,..., t2) we distinguish two cases. First, when we have that lAtj C HI 
for all i = I, . . . , n. Then using Proposition 4.5, At, E HI for all i = 1, . . . , n. By 
induction hypothesis for t, , . . . , t, we obtain that s(t) =f”( [ t,], . . . ) [t,,]). Because 
~df(tl,..=, t,,) E HI and (F), we have that Af( t, , . . . ~ g,,,! &U-O, so that j(t) = 
“f-%,1, * l . , [t,,]) = I~. In the second case, when lAtj E W for some j = I,. . . , I!, 
then by induction hypothesis $( tJ = Lo, and so j(t) = lA because of the definition 
off.% 
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or t=if x then t 1 : we obtain from 1 t E I-II and (B) tha either x II ldt, or 1~ 
or -I& belongs to 0-I. Using the inducti hypothesis we ve the following three 
cases. First s(x) =,t and J(t,> = IA9 second j(x) =f and t rd s(x) = _L. It is easy 
to realize that in all three cases, j(t) = IA. For t en t, else L, a ve:y similar 
reasoning can be made. !I 
(0 t1 = t@Hl~At,, At&HI and t, = t2 (from he definition of = and (A)). 
aqt,)=J(tJ=[t,]=[tJ 
(induction hypothesis for tl and t2) 
=Liqt, = tz) =I (semantics of -). 
(2) B(L=*r foralli=l,...,n (A) 
=M PO I, l l l 9 t”)) = P%t,l, = l 0, [tn]) =_t 
(induction hypothesis for t, , . . . , tn 
and definition of pscy L 
(3) AtdM~(t)=[t]f_L~ (induction hypothesis for t) 
+&At) =,t (semantics of A). 
(4) 7~ E 0-U: We make induction again over q. 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
14 = t&Hl~t, = t&Hi and At,, At&H ((F) and (A)) 
*j( r;j z 9( tzj 
(definition of =r and induction hypothesis for tl and tz) 
*3(t, = t-J =J 
1p(t, 9 - l l , t,)~W~Ati~Wfora5ii=1....,n (A) 
*J(p(t,, l l * 9 43 = P.“(M, l l l , [t,lJ =f 
(induction hypothesis r ti , . . . , t,, and definition of p*“). 
1At E IH=+.$( t) = I/, (induction hypothesis for t) 
1 (semantics 
~~pdl-O=kpdHl (A) 
*j(q) =t (in 
=G(11tp)=_r. 
othesis) 
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(4.9 l(<pA~jdt4==3lcpEWOrlJ/Ek~ (B) 
*S(icp) =j or S(--#) =j (induction hypothesis) 
‘9(~ 2 rF/) =f (semantics of 7 and A) 
=+3(++0 A #jj=j. 
13x(p E Hafor all t adequate to W: -o( A? A cp[ t/x]) E M] (C) 
*for all t E Tw (because t E &,==kiF E W t is adequate to W): 
&dt)=f or&o[F/x])=f 
) and induction hypothesis) 
*for all t E T& s( &/xl) = f (induction hypothesis for t) 
*for all t E Too :3[$( t)/x]( q) = f (Substitution Lemma) 
*for all a E : j[ a/x1( cp) = f (definition of 
*3(13xtp) =_t. 
(4.7) IA<P E HI: We make induction over q: 
(4.7.1) Id(r,-tZ)~W~~Atl~Wor7At2~Mj (B) 
*S(t,)=J_.or41(t,)=Ia 
(induction hypothesis for t, and 12) 
+G( t, = L) = _L (semantics of-) 
*&lA( t, = L)) =I (semantics of 1 a 
(4.72) -~dp( t; 9 . a . , t,,) E HI: We distinguish two cases. 
Case 1 
-lAr,aMIforalli=l,...,n 
*3(rj)=[?Jforallt=B,...,n 
(Proposition 4.5 and induction hypothesis for t, , . . . , t,,) 
*J(p(4,*.., t,,)) = I ((F) and defin&n oft, /i 
r,,)) =_t (semantics of A and 3, 
Case 2 
-~A~+Hlforsomej=l,...,n 
=3j( p(r,, . . . , t,,)) = I 
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~AAtdHl~FdHl (A) 
(absurd by (F)). So 1AAt ~ IN 
(4.7.4) lLil$u E!-s --do E 0-U (Akd(lAtp) =j (in uction hypothesis) 
=+&-rA~rp) =f (semantics of1 and A). 
(4.7.5) lA(p A $) E W=+lAp /\ IA@ E HI or 9 #I -p1 I,!~~o~-~A~~AJ,EW (rs) 
*aJ A (li = I (induction hy 
=+$(lA((p A #)) =I. 
(47.6) --iA3xcp E lHl~3x~Aq, dx(A<p A q) E 0-l (A) 
+$[a/~]( 50) = J. for some a E A, and for all a E 
Ralxl(~) f: 1: S[alxlW =f 
(induction hypothesis and semantics of 3, A, etc.) 
*$(3x& - 1 
+&lA3x(p) =,t. 
qdHi~FdHl (A) 
(absurd by (F)). So 7AAcp @ II-O. 
(5) ~~NEW*<P,~C/EW (A) 
=+s( p) = J( +) = _t (induction hypothesis) 
‘J(Q A I)) =I. 
(6) 3x~~W~cp~~/x]~Wforsomec~C (D) 
*there is tE TH such that 3(&/x]) =_r 
(take c as t and apply induction hypothesis) 
*there is t E TM such that 3[$( t)/x]+) = _t 
(SubsCitution Lemma) 
*there is a E suchthat $[a/x](Q)=_t 
+&3XQ)=& 
Idotice that Q[C/X] implies c E TM if x oc rs free in Q; the case where x does 
not occur free in Q can be proved mo-‘e sim 
(7) AQEWdQEWOrlQEW (B) 
*&Q)=jOr&lQ)=j (i 
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. A tableau for a non-empty set of formulas @ is complete i 
open branch of it, with set W of formulas label ing its nodes, satisfies 
(a) @cW, 
(b) Ml is a intikka set. 
(Existence of canonical tableau). very non-empty set of formulas has 
a compelte tableau. 
aosL Let @ ={(pO, q,, . . . , (P,,, . . . } be an enume tion of the set of formulas fo 
whi zh we want to build a complete tableau. First, w fix the following enumerations: 
V = {x0, x1 , . . .} (variables); 
~={cO,c1,~4 ( auxiliary constants); 
T = { to9 t19 . . .} (X-terms); 
O={&, e,,.. .) (equality axioms of signature 2; without loss of general- 
ity, we suppose that &, is Vx(x = x)); 
G={yo,y,,.=. } (universal S-formulas). 
We give now a schematic while-program which (in at most countably many steps) 
yields a complete tableau, which we call the canonical tableau for a>: 
begin 
while not cornplete?( x\ ) ds 
begin 
9: := ah-l-extension ( &); 9: := c-extension ( F[); 
9 S+l := n-extension (9:); 
s:=s+l 
end 
en 
where 
abd-extension ( Ts) modifies 9, by performing the following operations: 
(1) enlargewithcy,,..., cy,, every open branch passing through a node c at ievel 
. 
(2) iilit with B,, . . . , en branch passing through a no 
(3) for every open br through a node S at level S, 
such that ci does not occur i enlarge it with S(Ci)* 
c-cxtension( 5:) modifies 9: following the pr 
choose the least pair (i,j) E N x N 
adequate to the branch and yi( ti) 
branch with yi ( ti ). 
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nsion(T’f) enlarges every open branch of 3: with the new nodes labelled 
i; it exists, and &, if it is adequate to the branch. 
ile-program stops after a finite number of steps s, the canonical 
is the finite tableau Y$. Otherwise the c leau is infinite, 
0th cases it can 
be proved that 
Now, we are able t ve the completeness of ta 
.2. Let @ be a set of for ulas such that there is no 
nonical tableau &, is o . If & is a finite tableau, 
it has an open branch, because it is not closed. If &, is infinite, it has an infinite 
branch, because of Kiinig’s Lemma (cf. [ 161). This h is open, since any closed 
branch is finite. In both cases, &, has an open b labelled by a Hintikka set 
W 3 @, because 9@ is complete. By Lemma 4.6, Sat, a. 0 
leaux and complete ca 
In this section we show how how the tableaux od can be used to define 
st3icient conditions for the formal derivability in a calculus to be complete. Indeed, 
we will extract these conditions for PFOL. We are looki for completeness with 
respect o the weak consequence relation, which is deno by +. That is, we will 
give a calculus whose formal derivability, denoted by I-, will satisfy, for any set 
@ u {p} of formulas, that @ I- 50 holds iff @ I= 50. We are going to work with a 
sequent calculus. Let us recall that sequents are pairs (f, cp) where the antecedent r
is a finite set of formulas and the consequent (9 is a formula. We shall give axioms 
and rules to derive sequents; the notation r I- p will mean that the sequent (r, 50) 
is derivable. @ I- 50 will hold, by definition, ifI r i- rg holds for some finite r c @. 
In the sequel, we reserve r, r’ for finite sets of formulas. 
By Proposition 2.6 and Theorem 4.2 we know tha @ + Q holds if and only if 
@ v (-IV} has a closed tableau. To infer @ + 9 from th existence of a closed tab:eau 
for @w {lcp} it is necessary to establish some connection between the tableaux 
formal derivability in a calculus working with formulas of our language. 
The following results do that. 
rz’vability in a calculus 5% satisfies the following eight conditions, 
alctrlus for PEOL (with respect to weak consequence): 
(0) for any non-empty set @ of Zformulas and any>nite tableau Y for 4p, if every 
branch qf 3 with sei of labels r satisjes k I- F, then Il I-- F, where lI is the subset of 
(1) SU(VJ<~)+ F; 
( 4PJ . 9 
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(3) I--u bP, -D 
x} I- F for all vuriables x; 
(5) ru{lAc}c-FforalzcEC; ” 
(6) ru(l&-F*rkp; 
(7) f k t/Xd-tJI”t- 4p, fOi- CUly r’. 
roof. Let u ((9) be any set of formulas. @ I= p guarantees, by 
and Theorem 4.2, that Qp u (19) has a closed (so fi ite) tableau 5. By conditions 
(l)-(S), from any branch of 9 we can derive F. By condition (0), if 
of @ v (19) used in the construction of 9 then n I- F. By condition ( 
for some (finite) Go C_ Qi. Because of (6) we have Q0 I-- q, so @ t- <p. 0 
Whereas conditions (1)-(7) are specific conditions over derivability in the calculus, 
condition (0) is still a too generic relation between tableaux and derivability. We 
reduce it to more specific conditions through the following result. 
.2. !‘~heJormaZ derivability in a calculus %’ satis$es the following conditions: 
(7) r k- (p*ru r’k q, for any 1 ‘I; 
(8) foreverycu~ALFA,lk{cu,,...,a,}~cp~~u{cu}~<p; 
(9) for every PE BETA, ru{#3,}+ r;k,.  . , ~u(&} I- cp~Ib(~} I-- q; 
(10) for every y E GAMMA and every s-term t, Tu{ y( t)} t- cp3r u {y} I- <p; 
(11) for every S E DELTA and every new auxiliary constant symbol c not occurring 
inru(S,cp}, ru(s(c)j~~3ru{8j~cp; 
(12) for every equality axiom 0, r v (0) t- p==3r + <p; 
(13) ru{~j++(sr~cp-++. 
l%en, for any non-empty set of Z-formulas @, any Z-formula n and any finite tableau 
3 for @, if every branch of S with set of labels r satisfies r I- T n 14 I- T, where 
IT is the subset of@ used in 3. In particular, condition (0) of Lemt 5.1 holds for %‘. 
roof. Let Y be a finite tableau for @ with r branches, let p7 be the finite subset 
of @ whose formulas actually occur in 5, and let r, 9 r,, . . . , rr be the fin 
of formulas labelling each branch of X We shall prove ri t- n; i = 1,. . . , r+ 
The proof is made by induction on the construction of 9. Let &,, $, . . . 
a finite tableaux sequence for @ s = 9, we will reas 
k. For k = 0, accord 
> 0 we have six di 
cases. In all cases we 
for &-, . Thus we suppose in all of the 
prove that lI I- rr. We have th 
because of the induction hy 
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Case (a): Yk results from the ap lication to &-, df the ru 
esis that means 
ave r: I- 7r for all 
IIT, and because of (al ) we 
(bl) II=W, 
(b2) r=O-m-1, 
(b3) r,.,, = r:.,, w ,j=Q,...,m-1, whe 
(b4) rI = r: for all 
at I’: I-- 77, for all i = 1, . . . , 8 from (b?), (b3), (b4) and condition 
follows as in Case (a). 
Case (c): & comes from TL _, using 
(cl) n = W, 
(c2) P = P8, 
nition 3.6, so that 
(~3) S, = r:,w (r(t)), where y E r:. and I is a term adequate to r:,, 
(~4) &=r: forall i=l,...,r-1. 
From condition (10) applied to (~3) we know that r:* I- 7r and because of (~2) 
and (c4), r: I- r for all i = 1,. . . , r’. This together with the induction hypothesis 
yields WI--- n, and then I7 I-- rr, because of (cl). 
Case (d): According to rule (d) in Definition 3.6 for obtaining Y,, from &, we 
have 
(dl) I7=I7’, 
td2) r = r’, 
(d3) r, = r:.u {6(c)}, where S E r:. and r is a new auxiliary constant which does 
not occur in r:., 
(24) &=r: forall i=l,...,r-1 
SO that using condition (11) we can obtain that II t- n as in the last case. 
Case (e): From rule (e) in Definition 3.6, for some equality axiom 8 we have 
(el) n=I?‘, 
(e2) Y = r’. 
(e3) r, = ryu (e}, 
(e4) ri=r: forall i=l,...,r--1. 
Applying condition (12) to (e3) and L -sing (e2) and (e4) we have that 1‘: t- 7~ for _ , 
hich because of (el) and the induction hypothesis implies I7 I-- ar. 
is case Y,, is obtained b) enla en branch of Tk_, 
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(l-2) r = Y), 
(f3) 17 = ri u { cp} if r: is an open branch, 
(f4) ri = ri if ri is a CIOSMI branch. 
en, for all i = 1, . . . , r 
c ! rr=# v (~a> I- rr ((f3), (f4) and co 
=+r;cQ-,77 (condition (13)) 
=HT’t-Q-W (( f2) and induction hy 
~~‘u {cp} I- T (condition (13) j
*m-n (fl). cl 
orohy 5.3. A calculus % is complete for PFOL if it satkfies 
ti) conditions (l)-(7) in Lemma 5.1, 
(ii) conditions (8)-( 13) in TImrem 5.2. 
Proof. (ii) guarantees condition (0) of Lemma 5.1 and (i) the rest of the conditions 
for a calculus to be complete according to Lemma 5.1. El 
It will now suffice if we can design any calculus which satisfies (I)-( 13). at the 
same time, we must take care of the soundness of he proof rules because the above 
conditions guarantee only the completeness. For example, if we introduce a proof 
rule with the form I- 6 for each equality axiom, and another proof rule 
then condition (12) is satisfied, but the last proof rule is not sound as the following 
counterexample proves: 0 i== F, I= 0, but not t= F. 
The calculus which satisfies Corollary 5.3 in a trivial way. that is to say, the 
calculus containi for each derivabi roof rule, is soun 
mplete but it is t very natural; it is so much influe by the tableaux method, 
that almost all proofs it allows us to make in a 
give a more natura 
that it satisfies Corollary 5.3. In t 
-kP, 9 cp2, l - l 3 
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Sta.wtural rule 
(I ASP) Tkcs 
r,rQ-- $0 
Equality 
(REV 
(W 
wn 
WEI 
(Subs) 
+t=t 
E=(ifX then t)==t 
e- (if x then t, else t2) = I, 
1~ I- (if ,.y then t, else t2) = t2 
r I-- dt/xl 
r, t -5 s t- q&h] 
Connectizje rules 
(UT&) I’ F TAti r i- TAti 
r~~(tl,~=-,tll) n-lplt,,.*.,tn) 
(1SiSn) 
IAX t- + for all variables x 
First order logic _for partial .functions 
uw I- I- At A &lx] f- Twxl 
FClXrp r t- 13xcp 
I-V-IX aT t- --~dt 
r I- TAif x then t r t- 1Aif x then i 
(DIF) 
mm rt-A~,r~X-,At,,r~~X-,Ar, 
r I-- Aif x then tl else i2 
(UIF-v r t- l(,y A At,), l- I- 1(1x A At,) 
r I-- 1Aif x then t, else t2 
(DW r b- At,, r I- A?, (D1) 
P-- A(t, ‘u tJ l-~-A-y 
(D3) I- I- 3x(Aip A cp) 
rhA3x(p 
(UFor) r I- ~0, r I- -IV 
n=lA<p 
(DTer) I- AAt 
The following are some derived rules that are used in the completeness proof 
and in the example. 
(Asp) rkcpifcpE@ (El-c) n--l-1$0 
rt-cp 
WC) bwrc, 
rl--(P++ (8 equality axiom) 
The main property a logic must satisfy is soundness. e soundness of a lo 
mea,las that every formula p w a set of 
through a calculus, is a logical conse 
is sound; that is 
y for all rules, in view of the semantics of 
Since 531 !sgical conse 
proving (not false), in e 
model of @. Wh is true and defined, we have to 
prove @ + ~0 and @ F Aq. 
slier, the proof of completeness of ur calculus is based on a specific 
n the classification of formulas to build the tableaux and some of 
the proof rules in the calculus. This relation is shown through the following result. 
2. Let r be a finite set of formu1a.c then: 
(a) for any for~~~~l~ cy E ALFA with constituents q, . . . , a??, and for any iE 
(1 T-=‘Y m): r I- --wi3~ b ---a 
09 fop any for /3 EBETA with constituents /3,, . . . , Pm : 
roof. (a) is proved by checking 
(1 9**-, m} there is a proof rule in 
~k-l~, 
n-lla 
that for every formula cy E AkFA and any i E 
SW% which either directly matches the pattern 
iently similar to this pattern to allow us a very short formal derivation of 
, for proving (b) it is enough ta rea!hze that for every F E 
is a proof rule in the calculus whit 
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e will prove that WWZ satisfies the thirteen conditions in Co 
nditions (l)-(7) are irectly satisfied ixxause of the 
e following is a schematic proof of condition (8): 
*r, al,. . . , a,-2, Ly,lcp I-- la,_] (Ctp,) 
*f-i Ql, l l - 9 Qfnt-2, Q!,l@--1cY ( roposition 6.2(a)) 
and iterating the procedure for Q!~,_~, . . a , a, : f’, a t- cp. 
To prove condition (9) is even easier: 
r, j3; I- q (1 S i S IPZ) (assumptions) 
*r,1@--1p; (l~ie?z) (Gtp,) 
*r, -M~J I- ip (Proposition 6.2(b)) 
“r, P t- q (Ctp,). 
For condition (IO) we give the following 
r, l(At A &/xl) I- $ (assumption) 
+r, 1+ I- ll(Ar h &lx]) (Ctp& 
+r,l$w-dth(P[t/X] (hlc) 
a-, 1+ t- 3~~ (IX) 
+r, 73~~ f-- 7+ tap,) 
+r, 7xp t- + (hlc). 
Condition (11) can be prove 
r, cp[clCI t- $ (ass J 
=sc 3 t- 344x1 (Ctp,) 
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e formal pmof of condition (12) is made using (MP,), and so, we must prove 
for e J Gcy equality axiom f): I’ + 8 and r I- A@. TO prove this., one uses the equality 
axioms belonging to 99% and the proof rules (Subs), (IVC), (EA), (DEA) and 
definedness rules. 
Condition (13) holds thanks to the proof rules (I + C) and (E+ C), n 
= 13x(pred(O) = x) and # = 
te the set (q, -I+}. Now, we 
prove %p b=- 91; as follows: 
) A pred(o) = pred(0) 
+x(pred(O) = x) b pred(O) c 0 
--Glx(pred(O) = x) + s(pred(0) 7 0) 
73x(pred(O) = x) + lA(pred(0) < 0) 
(ASP), 
WF), 
(2)s (IASP), 
(I), (3), (I AC), 
(4 (I=), 
(9, WPl), 
W, W’W, 
w, w-w, 
(7), (8), (UFor). 
7. oncIusioas and related work 
e aim of this paper is not just to give a sound and complete logic dealing with 
1 functions, but rather to clarify the differences and relationships among the 
possible semantic frameworks for partial logics and to provide a good methodology 
for building sound and complete calculi for these logics. The language of PFOL 
has been fixed with the intention of not introducing too many operators and giving 
to the operators a meaning as weak and independent of computational aspects as 
possible. For this reason, we do not include sequential connectives like “cand” and 
“car” in [13] or “A” and “v” in [21]. Our equality is weak, and we do not include 
a strong equality like “= =” in [3]. All these features can be obtained as derived 
logical symbols in our framework. In particular, a strong equation t, = = f2 can be 
expressed as t, = l2 A At, A At2; while the weak equality cannot be reduced to the 
strong one. oreover, our semantic considerations about logical consequence and 
our methodology are independent of the fixed language. We think that further 
interesting work could be done using the methodology presented here to design 
logics dealing with non-strict partial functions and typed logics. 
We have opted for l=Sw as logical consequence for our logic because it has some 
desirable semantic properties and it is weaker than K w,,. and t=S,. The other candidates 
for logical consequence are expressable in terms of &. 
thors have investigated fi for partial functions. Ebbinghaus 
ts a three-valued logic to the one presented here, with a 
ce obtained throug 
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(1) 4 is a model of 9, written .& 9, cp, is analogous to 9; b.S ~0, except r the 
following case: .d9(Q-,+)e(d9Q*d$ ). So Q+ 4) is an always fined 
formula. From his definition, we can easily pr e: JJ I=,Q*.&~;Q~ 
(2) Q is 8 logical consequence of a set of formulas @, written @ ii- U, if an 
if for every 9, (Jti$ @*.lu 9 Q). By (I)> P is incomparable with !==%, (because 
@n-,0, t#,,R+n and a+&! IhcF,R+0l=,,F). 
Ebbinghaus [lo] defines a sequent calculus fo %bPPr_ and proves its soun 
and completeness using a Henkin-styl, construction. 
In [S] a natural deduction calculus, which is da med to be sound and complets 
with respect o l=,,, is presented. However, the discussion about semantics is informal 
and there is no explicit definition for the consequence relation. As in our lo 
formulas are interpreted using three boolean values. Let us denote by +sC.J 
derivability in that calculus. The relationship with our calculus (t-~.zc ) is give 
General conditions for a calculus for !=,, to be complete can be given through 
our methodology in the same way they have been extracted for k”,,- in this paper. 
The discussion in [I41 is about proof rules causing derivability to have I= ,, or 
I= SH’ as semantic counterpart. But the discussion there is restricted to two specific 
calculi. The first one is the calculus presented in [3] and a second calculus which 
is claimed to be sound and complete with respect to i==,.FH. is presented. A lot of 
comparisons between both calculi from a proof theoretical viewpoint are presented. 
Again, [14] uses three boolean values but no definition of semantics is given, 
although the logical consequence is claimed to be k.S,,.. 
In [ 191 we meet a different situation. The main discussion is about specifications 
allowing partial functions. As in the previous works mentioned above, semantic 
issues are secondary: a logic for strict algebras is presented, claiming its soundness 
but not studying its completeness. 
Owe [2l] presents a typed formal system for program reasoning where formulas 
are boolean expressions of a typed language. The reasoning is based on a partial 
logic, called Weak Logic. The logical consequence notion of Weak Logic is +=ww 
(denoted there by l=&. It is defined over weak validity (k ,) in the following way 
(using our notation): 
where @’ must be understood as in Proposition 2.7, 
The proof of completeness of Weak Logic given in [Z] is, from our point of 
view, much too difficult because two auxiliary logics are use 
On the other hand, the relationship between any sound a 
for l=H.w, like Owe’s calculus, and any other sound and co 
c= SW 9 like ours, is given by 
ere are still some other related works which investigate three valued and many 
all-4 !Qgics in a eneral setting, with no special reference to computer science. 
them, we may quote [S] and [Xi]. 
completing our work we knew of the inde ndent and related work [ 171, 
which studies some semantic oncepts in three l aiu llowing an approach 
quite simi’nar to ours. ey extend the possibiliti nirag the logical con- 
sequence by s~ec~~~~g: 
ectives and ~u~nti~~rs~ 
hy and Kleene and th 
connectives and , K (Kleene’s connectives and quantifiers) and 
C (classical case). 
(2) the concepts of strong and weak model, as in this paper. 
Relying on (I) and (2), Konikowska, Tarlecki and Blikle [ 17) study several 
relations of logical consequence noted as b s,, where V E {MK, K, C} and p, y E {s, w}. 
d and complete sequent calculus for b E” , proving completeness 
d. However, their logic does not make explicit mention of partial 
either equality nor a definedness operator A. 
The authors are greatly indebted to Mario Rodriguez Artalejo for inspiration, 
fruitful discussions and his patient revision of the manuscript. We also would like 
to thank Teresa Hortala Gonzalez and Ana Gil Luezas for their comments. 
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